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Science is self-correcting, or so the adage goes, but to what
extent is that indeed the case? Answering this question
requires careful consideration of the various approaches to
achieve the collective goal of self-correction. One of the most
straightforward mechanisms is individual self-correction:
researchers rectifying their own mistakes by publishing a
correction notice. Although it offers an efficient route to
correcting the scientific record, it has received little to no
attention from a metascientific point of view. We aim to fill
this void by analysing the content of correction notices
published from 2010 until 2018 in the three psychology
journals featuring the highest number of corrections over that
timespan based on the Scopus database (i.e. Psychological
Science with N = 58, Frontiers in Psychology with N = 99 and
Journal of Affective Disorders with N = 57). More concretely, we
examined which aspects of the original papers were affected
(e.g. hypotheses, data-analyses, metadata such as author
order, affiliations, funding information etc.) as well as the
perceived implications for the papers’ main findings. Our
exploratory analyses showed that many corrections involved
inconsequential errors. Furthermore, authors rarely revised
their conclusions, even though several corrections concerned
changes to the results. We conclude with a discussion of
current policies, and suggest ways to improve upon the present
situation by (i) preventing mistakes, and (ii) transparently
rectifying thosemistakes that do find their way into the literature.1. Introduction
As researchers, we devote our careers to uncovering interesting
facts, developing theories, improving research practices or






































in journals, books and conference proceedings. Nobody is without flaw, though and mistakes could
infiltrate our work. Despite peer-review and other error-detection procedures, some of these mistakes
find their way into the literature. Thus, rectifying them is critical to build an unbiased knowledge
base. After all, science is assumed to be self-correcting.
There is more than one way to Rome, though. Correcting the scientific record can, for instance, be
achieved via ‘normal progression of a discipline’ [1, p. 3]. By conducting research, spurious findings and
flawed theories get exchanged for new ones. When it comes to correcting or updating empirical results,
independent replication studies, which are gradually becoming more mainstream [2], may be considered
the gold standard. However, replications often require substantial investments (e.g. time, money,…), or
might even be completely unfeasible. Not to mention, replication studies can be flawed in their own right.
Fortunately, some erroneous conclusions can be corrected in a more efficient fashion. One could, for
instance, try to analytically reproduce the reported results using the original data (if these are shared; e.g.
[3]). Alternatively, one might use tools such as statcheck [4] to uncover mistakes in (the reporting of)
statistical analyses, without needing the raw data. Yet another possibility is to assess the robustness of
a finding by not merely following one particular data-analytic pathway, but many (a multiverse
analysis; [5]).
That being said, there are legitimate concerns about the pace and efficiency of these self-corrective
mechanisms. Moreover, they can even result in an unproductive back-and-forth, as illustrated by the
oft-dismissive responses to criticism documented by Goldacre et al. [6].
Yet another approach to achieve the collective goal of scientific self-correction is via individual self-
correction. Whenever authors become aware of an error in one of their publications, they could set the
record straight by issuing a correction notice. Such statements often contain information on which aspects
of the work requires correction, as well as their impact on the conclusions. When the error is considered
too egregious, or fraudulent practices were discovered, the publication might get retracted altogether,
though. Corrections and retractions are a fundamentally different form of scientific self-correction as it
does not follow the typical progression of research [1]. Rather it involves erasing certain information from
the scientific record and, in the case of a correction, replacing it with accurate information.
Of the various forms of scientific self-correction, retractions, ‘failed’ replications and reproducibility
problems have received a great deal of attention from the research community, as well as the public in
general. By contrast, correction notices remain largely unexplored [7], even though it seems a
straightforward mechanism to rid the literature of certain mistakes.1 Moreover, the mere publication of
correction notices is taken to mean that (psychological) science is self-correcting. For instance, Grcar
[8] used the number of corrections (and commentaries) divided by the number of published articles to
examine how self-correcting the written scientific record is.
So, even though correction notices are recognized as a form of scientific self-correction [1,8,9], one
might wonder how much they truly impact the underlying knowledge base. Do they also yield new
insights, and revise theories like other forms of scientific self-correction, or do they mostly involve
superficial aspects of the scientific record?
To address this question, we analysed the content of correction notices published in three psychology
journals. More specifically, we examined what aspect of the original paper required correction: the
hypotheses, methodology, data-handling, data-analyses, reporting, references, aesthetics, metadata (e.g.
author order, affiliations, funding information etc.), or something else. Furthermore, we assessed the
perceived impact on the paper’s initial conclusions, both from the authors’ point of view and that of a
reader, thus gauging whether a certain correction substantially affected the literature.2. Method
FollowingGrcar [8], we used Scopus to search for correction notices, as it has a designated document type for
such publications (i.e. document type=er, short for erratum). Note that the term erratum is sometimes
reserved for corrections following mistakes by the publisher (e.g. mishaps in the copyediting process).
However, in Scopus, it also encompasses corrections issued by the author(s) as well as retractions.
Considering publications in psychological research, it appears that the corrections-to-articles ratio
remained relatively stable from 2003 until 2011, after which it seems to steadily increase until 20171This is not a critique on replication studies or any other form of scientific self-correction. Individual self-correction is no silver bullet,
but it might be more efficient at times. For example, if authors find a critical mistake in their analyses, submitting a transparent

























































Figure 1. Evolution over time of the number of corrections divided by the number of articles published in psychology. The time






































(figure 1). In this paper, we focused on recent correction notices, such that relatively novel developments
(e.g. increased access to data) could potentially be captured, but we also included those from the years
immediately before the apparent (temporary) uptick in prevalence. Thus, we ultimately considered
corrections published from 2010 until 2018.2
This selection resulted in 4495 documents, which we opted to further narrow down in order to make
it practically feasible. That is, we selected the three journals with the highest number of corrections
published in the aforementioned time period, namely Frontiers in Psychology (99 corrections, relative to
9681 articles published in that timeframe), Journal of Affective Disorders (57 corrections, 5113 articles)
and Psychological Science (58 corrections, 1970 articles). Even though this is a non-random sample, it
does cover different publishers (i.e. Frontiers, Elsevier and SAGE), publication models (i.e. online, pay-
to-publish versus traditional, pay-to-read) and disciplines within psychology. It also follows other
meta-scientific studies in psychology that have opted to focus on multiple articles from a small
number of journals (typically one to four) rather than randomly selecting articles across an entire
domain, thus keeping policies and quality standards constant (e.g. [3,10–13]).
Figure 2 depicts the corrections-to-articles ratio for the selected journals in the timeframe under
consideration. The trends are comparable across the three journals in the sense that correction notices seem
to have become somewhat prevalent only in recent years, which also supports the decision to focus on the
period 2010–2018 rather than going back further. Note also that Frontiers in Psychology was only established
in 2010. Hence, a certain ‘correction lag’ is to be expected, yet the evolution over time is similar to the
other two journals. These figures should be interpreted with caution, though, as sample sizes are relatively
small. In addition, they are based on the Scopus database, which, for instance, includes some duplicates.
Each correction was coded by both authors independently, using a prespecified scheme featuring four
main variables: (i) which aspect(s) of the article required a correction, (ii) whether (some of) the results
presented in the original paper changed after correction, (iii) whether the conclusion regarding the main
findings remained unchanged according to the authors, and (iv) who initially discovered the error(s) in
the original article (see table 1 for an overview of all categories, and https://osf.io/uyqra/ for more
details including examples). More specifically, the corrected findings were first coded according to which
part of conducting scientific research they pertained to. Note that a correction could concern more than
one aspect (e.g. both the metadata and data-analysis of a given paper could contain an error). In such
cases, we coded all aspects that were affected.
When the results presented in the correction notice differed from those of the original article, their
pertinence was determined. Pertinent results were defined as those that have implications for the
main findings and conclusions of the original paper. This is arguably a subjective judgement, and
because many papers were beyond our area of expertise, it is possible that we misclassified some
cases (we revisit this issue in the Discussion). Changed results that were deemed pertinent were2We finished the coding of corrections in July 2019, which is why the selected time frame ends in 2018, unlike the x-axis of figure 1),
which runs through 2019.
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Figure 2. Evolution of the number of corrections divided by the number of articles published in Psychological Science (squares),
Frontiers in Psychology (dots) and Journal of Affective Disorders (triangles) across the selected timeframe. The numbers were
extracted from Scopus on 30 July 2020.




result type bolster conclusion
aesthetics Bayes factor no different conclusion, different results author(s)
data-analysis effect size yes same conclusion, different results journal
data-handling p-value unclear same conclusion, same results someone else
hypotheses other unclear conclusion, different results unknown











































further subdivided into four categories: p-values, standardized effect sizes, Bayes factors and a rest
category including raw effect sizes (e.g. means, unstandardized regression coefficients, and the like;
these were labelled as ‘other’ in table 1). For each pertinent change, the original value was compared
with the corrected value, to assess whether the corrected value bolstered the original conclusion
regarding that finding (e.g. values more extreme in the direction of the drawn conclusion versus
values being less extreme or going in the opposite direction of what was claimed initially).3
Moreover, we also examined the conclusion of the correction notice. That is, we determined whether
the authors explicitly state that their original conclusion remains unchanged, or requires revision. If they
made no statement regarding the conclusion, or if the notice was deemed ambiguous in this regard, we
classified it as unclear.
Lastly, for each correction, we examined who discovered the error in the original paper: the authors
themselves, the journal it was published in, someone else, or whether the information provided in the
correction notice was insufficient to deduce who discovered the error.
After both authors evaluated the correction notices, their results were compared. In case of
disagreement, the correction in question was re-examined, and the most appropriate coding was
selected after discussion between both authors. Retractions were filtered out, and thus not included in
the following analyses.3One could view this as a rather crude measure to evaluate whether a conclusion was bolstered, but theories or hypotheses tested
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Note that the current study did not seek to test any a priori hypotheses. Instead, it was exploratory in
nature, as little is known about this domain. Also, the study’s protocol was not formally pre-registered,
even though the coding scheme was designed in advance. As such, the results should be interpreted with
due caution.3. Results
As illustrated by figure 3, corrections mostly involved reporting errors (N = 71, 28.74%), incorrect referencing
(N = 26, 10.53%) or metadata (N = 77, 31.17%). Errors that typically impact the originally presented results
and conclusions, such as those concerning the hypotheses, methodology, data-handling and data-analysis,
comprised a smaller percentage of corrected errors (i.e. N = 42, 17.00%), whereas errors pertaining to
aspects that typically do not substantially affect the scientific knowledge base such as aesthetics,
referencing or metadata accounted for a larger percentage of errors (i.e. N = 114, 46.15%). Note that
reporting errors could affect different aspects of a paper that may or may not impact its main findings,
hence they were not included in this comparison. The same goes for corrections that were coded as ‘other’
because they did not fall in any of the eight categories (e.g. incorrect interpretation of the results or
previous findings, adding new information in the form of appendices, etc.). Figure 3 also reveals that the
distribution of correction types differs across journals to some extent. Most notably, Psychological Science
published relatively more corrections notices mentioning mistakes in the data-analysis, whereas issues
regarding metadata were less prevalent compared with the other two journals.4
Across all categories and journals, 65 corrections (30.37%) involved changes to some of the results.
Out of those corrections that presented different results, 3 (4.62%) mentioned that the conclusion
regarding their main findings changes. Twenty-nine (44.62%) did not explicitly address the impact on
the original conclusions, whereas 33 (50.77%) suggested that their main conclusions still hold. A
break-down by journal revealed that most corrections in Frontiers in Psychology claimed that the main
conclusions remain the same (i.e. out of 16 corrections with different results 14 or 87.50% stated that
the conclusions still hold). This percentage was much lower for the other two journals (i.e. 16 out of
30 or 53.33% for Psychological Science, and 3 out of 19 or 15.79% for Journal of Affective Disorders).
Often, the corrected results were not strikingly different from the original findings. As such, it seems
justifiable to claim that the original conclusions remain valid. However, in some cases, it can be
misleading to present the conclusions as unchanged. For example, a p-value that is no longer4Note that a given correction can involve multiple aspects, but this rarely occurred. Of the 214 corrections, 191 (89.25%) pertained to
only one aspect.


















































considered statistically significant, or a 50% reduction in the effect size, could be viewed as substantial
changes (depending on the statistical philosophy).
To examine this, we first assessed for each correction that presented changed results (N = 65), whether
it involved a pertinent finding. Fifty-four (83.08%) of such corrections included at least one pertinent
corrected result. Compared with the total number of corrections published in each respective journal,
those appearing in Psychological Science often involved changes to pertinent results (i.e. 27 out of 58
corrections or 46.55%). This figure was much lower in the other two journals (i.e. 13 out of 99
corrections or 13.13% for Frontiers in Psychology and 14 out of 57 corrections or 24.56% for Journal of
Affective Disorders).
Next, we compared the original values with the reported values and evaluated the impact on the
conclusions. Of all the 476 pertinent results in total, 73 (15.34%) bolstered the original conclusion, whereas
151 (31.72%) weakened the original conclusion. In the remaining cases, it was unclear how the change
affected the conclusions. This occurred fairly often, and for a variety of reasons such as inexact reporting
of the results, inexperience of the coders with the particular domain, or inherent subjective decisions (e.g.
smaller effect sizes that were estimated more precisely or vice versa). This distribution was fairly similar
across journals with 6 out of 46 (13.04%), 60 out of 380 (15.79%) and 7 out of 50 (14.00%) pertinent results
bolstering the original conclusion, versus 14 (30.43%), 123 (32.37%) and 14 (28.00%) pertinent results
weakening the original conclusion for Frontiers in Psychology, Psychological Science and Journal of Affective
Disorders, respectively. These results also show that the number of pertinent results was much higher for
corrections in Psychological Science compared with the other two journals.
Comparing the amount of pertinent resultswith the numberof corrections reveals that certain corrections
feature many pertinent results. This is illustrated by figure 4, which depicts the distribution of the number of
pertinent results per correction. Thus, pertinent results are not independent from one another as some come
from the same article. Consequently, if one result weakens the conclusion of a particular article, others from
the same correction might have a comparable effect. To take this dependency into account, we calculated a
secondmeasure of perceived impact, as judged by the coders, in which every study got an equal weight. The
results were fairly similar: the prevalence of bolstering conclusionswas 15.54% relative to 24.65%weakening
the original conclusion (a break-down by journal also revealed comparable results).
Whether or not a result is judged to bolster the original conclusions is of course a subjective
assessment to a certain extent, and should therefore be taken with a pinch of salt. Indeed, the coders’
initial classification was often not exactly the same. Considering the corrections, the coders agreed on
all aspects (i.e. the correction type, perceived implications and source of the correction) in 52.63% of
the cases. When focusing on pertinent results, complete agreement was 38.03%. Both numbers, and
the latter in particular, do get deflated because of missing evaluations (i.e. aspects or outcomes not
considered by one of the coders), rather than actual disagreements.
percentage error on a base-10 logarithmic scale
1 10 100 1000






































Nevertheless, to address concerns about objectivity, we also compared the raw values, before and
after correction, as these are not (or less) subject to alternative interpretations. To this end, we focused
on the p-values and effect sizes that were exactly reported in both the original paper and the
correction notice (none of the corrections mentioned Bayes factors). To compare different measures of
effect size, we adopted the percentage error (PE) metric proposed by Hardwicke et al. [3] for
evaluating reproducibility errors. It divides the absolute difference between the original and correct
effect size by the absolute value of the original effect size:
PE ¼ jcorrect originaljjoriginalj :
Hardwicke and colleagues considered PEs greater than 10 to be major numerical errors, though this cut-
off is somewhat arbitrary. Figure 5 shows the distribution of PEs from the correction notices, plotted on a
base-10 logarithmic scale for presentation purposes and collapsed across journals as the results were
comparable. Interestingly, most corrected effect size would be considered major numerical errors,
whereas only 5% of the discrepancies discovered in Hardwicke et al.’s analytic reproducibility project
fell in this category.
Furthermore, we also examined the original and corrected (pertinent) p-values, though not in terms
of PE as they are all on the same scale (figure 6). We again collapsed across journal, because most of these
values came from just one journal (i.e. Psychological Science). One might argue that more originally
significant p-values became statistically insignificant (using the typical alpha-level of 0.05) after
correction, than vice versa. However, there are a number of caveats, which also apply to the above
analysis of effect size. The sample size was somewhat small, and the underlying values were not
independent from one another as some came from the same corrected article. In addition, publication
bias might filter out some non-significant incorrect results that, upon correction, would have turned
out statistically significant. Hence, one should interpret these figures with due caution.
Finally, most of the corrections provided no information regarding who discovered the error(s) in the
original paper (i.e. 181 or 84.58%). Only, 13 (6.07%) mentioned that someone else found an error in the
original paper, another 14 (6.54%) were issued by the journal they were published in and 6 (2.80%) came
as a result of the authors discovering the mistake(s) themselves. A break-down by journal showed that it
is in general unclear who discovered the error(s) with 85 (85.86%), 47 (81.03%) and 49 (85.96%) of the
corrections in, respectively, Frontiers in Psychology, Psychological Science and Journal of Affective Disorders
providing no information in that regard.



































































Based on an analysis of correction notices published between 2010 and 2018 in Psychological Science,
Frontiers in Psychology and Journal of Affective Disorders, we can conclude that a substantial fraction
only updates the scientific record, but not the underlying knowledge base as such. That is, a large
number of notices concerned author order, the spelling of an author’s name, their affiliation, omitted
references, and the like. Even though these specific forms of individual self-correction all rectify a
mistake of some kind, they do not revise flawed scientific notions. In that sense, the publication
of correction notices is a poor indication of the degree to which (psychological) science is truly
self-correcting, thus nuancing previous claims (e.g. [8]).
Naturally, a non-negligible number of notices did involve a correction of the study’s outcome. However,
there were very few instances where the authors explicitly indicated that this changed the conclusions of the
original paper.5Most of the time, no explicit statement regarding the conclusionwas provided. This could be
because the authors considered the impact to be self-explanatory, because they were uncertain themselves,
because they were hesitant to denounce their findings, etc. In some cases, it can be obvious that a
conclusion remains unchanged, yet, in a substantial number of corrections without an explicit statement,
their impact can be rather ambiguous. This is especially striking for corrections published in Frontiers in
Psychology, because they have a template (‘Author Guidelines’, n.d. [14]) which by default includes the
sentence: ‘The authors apologize for this error and state that this does not change the scientific
conclusions of the article in any way.’ Consequently, the omission of this sentence might imply that the
conclusions do not remain the same, though this is pure speculation. The policy is interesting in its own
right, because it seemingly confirms or instils the notion that corrections are meant to reaffirm the status
quo. Indeed, nearly all corrections involving changes to the results claimed that the conclusions remained
the same, which was not the case for the other two journals under consideration. Instead of using such a
default, one could ask authors to choose between different outcome options, thus engaging them in more
critical reflection. Furthermore, creating a distinct category for corrections that concern authorship,
affiliations, and the like, would obviate rather bizarre statements such as ‘The name of author X was
misspelled. The authors apologize for this error and state that this does not change the scientific
conclusions of the article in any way.’ Although it has the advantage of removing any ambiguity, using it
like a one-size-fits-all statement also devaluates its meaning in general.5One could argue that major revisions of one’s original conclusions might end up as retractions instead. To address that possibility, we
post hoc examined the content of all 16 retraction notices in our sample. Only, five of those were due to honest mistakes. The remainder





































Even though most correction notices stated that the conclusions remain the same despite changes in the
results, a more nuanced picture emerged from the present study. Comparing the original with the corrected
results revealed that the latter weakened the papers’ conclusions more often than they strengthened it. Of
course, it is possible that some of the smaller quantitative differences need not prompt a qualitative
revision of the original conclusion, yet the apparent imbalance between conclusion-bolstering versus
conclusion-weakening corrections is still remarkable. By definition, corrections occur at the very end of
the entire publication process, and different factors could have contributed to this ostensible asymmetry.
For example, results that provided less support for a paper’s main conclusion might have been checked
more rigorously by the authors. Therefore, corrected results that end up bolstering the original conclusion
might be more rare. Another caveat is that the coding itself could be biased. The coders (i.e. both authors
of this paper) did have different backgrounds, which might mitigate that concern to some degree, though
it seems impossible to remove all subjectivity from this process. Finally, it remains to be seen whether
these results generalize to other journals within psychology. An analysis by journal did reveal that the
asymmetry between conclusion-bolstering versus conclusion-weakening corrections was fairly constant
across the three outlets under consideration, though.c.Open
Sci.7:2008344.1. Where is the self-correction?
Figure 1 showed that there is about 1 correction per 100 articles publishedwithin psychology. It is plausible to
assume, however, that many errors go undetected. If we only focus on the results section, we know from
previous studies that analytical reproducibility is far from perfect. For instance, Hardwicke et al. [3] found
that 24 out of 35 examined articles published with open data in the journal Cognition contained at least
one value that could not be reproduced independently. Even after assistance of the original authors,
results from 13 of those articles were still not reproducible. Unpublished work by Artner and colleagues
examining papers in four different journals showed similar results, as did a recent study by Hardwicke
et al. [15] involving articles appearing in Psychological Science. Thus, we can safely assume that many more
corrections should be published, if all errors would get detected.
Furthermore, surveys like the one from John et al. [16] revealed a disconcertingly high percentage of
researchers engaging in questionable research practices such as selectively reporting studies that
‘worked’, and adjusting data collection based on whether the results reached statistical significance.
Now that the consequences of the flexible exploitation of such researcher degrees of freedom are
better understood [17,18], one might have expected this to translate into corrections mentioning
questionable research practices or ‘p-hacking’. However, that was not the case in any of the corrections
we examined. Indeed, retrospective disclosure of this nature is rare in general (see also Rohrer et al. [19]).
Moreover, even if errors are discovered or recognized, there is no guarantee that this will result in a
correction. Consider, for instance, the aforementioned study by Hardwicke et al. [3]. Of the 24 articles
containing irreproducible results, only three author teams proposed to publish a correction, and, to date,
only one has effectively been published. That said, Hardwicke and colleagues noted that the inability to
reproduce those particular results seemingly did not affect the original papers’ conclusions. Hence,
authors and/or journals might find the publication of a formal correction unnecessary in such cases
where the mistakes do not have a big impact on the conclusions. This is also reflected in the policy of
Psychological Science (‘2020 Submission Guidelines’, n.d. [20]), which states that:A correction notice will be published if an error affects the publication record, the scientific integrity of the article,
or the reputation of the authors or the journal. In general, Psychological Science will not publish a formal correction
for spelling or grammatical errors or for errors that do not significantly affect an article’s findings or conclusions or
a reader’s understanding.Similarly, the American Psychological Association state in their code of conduct that ‘If psychologists
discover significant errors in their published data, they take reasonable steps to correct such errors in a
correction, retraction, erratum, or other appropriate publication means’ (‘Ethical Principles of
Psychologists and Code of Conduct’ [21]).
Leaving it up to the authors to evaluate when an error is deemed ‘significant’ makes sense because of
their obvious familiarity with the work. However, having to admit a mistake, especially one that impacts
the conclusions of their paper, might be considered embarrassing or potentially detrimental to one’s
career. Furthermore, cognitive biases and motivated reasoning [22] may play a role in deciding
whether an error is significant or not. Researchers are human too, which not only means that they
make mistakes but also that their reactions to mistakes can be imperfect. Therefore, the individual




































Interestingly, other guidelines like the one from the International Committee of Medical Journal
Editors are more straightforward (International Committee of Medical Journal Editors, [23]):oyalsocietypublishingPervasive errors can result from a coding problem or a miscalculation and may result in extensive inaccuracies
throughout an article. If such errors do not change the direction or significance of the results, interpretations,
and conclusions of the article, a correction should be published…Errors serious enough to invalidate a paper’s
results and conclusions may require retraction. However, retraction with republication (also referred to as
‘replacement’) can be considered in cases where honest error (e.g. a misclassification or miscalculation) leads to
a major change in the direction or significance of the results, interpretations, and conclusions..org/journal/rsos
R.Soc.Open
Sci.7:200834It is noteworthy that manuscripts submitted to Psychological Science should ‘conform to the
Recommendations for the Conduct, Reporting, Editing and Publication of Scholarly Work in Medical
Journals, which can be found in full at www.icmje.org’ (‘2020 Submission Guidelines’, n.d. [20]).
Hence, it is remarkable that Psychological Science’s policy ‘to not publish a formal correction … for
errors that do not significantly affect an article’s findings or conclusions’ contradict the
recommendation from the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors to publish a correction
when errors ‘do not change the direction or significance of the results, interpretations and conclusions
of the article.’ Their policy might explain why correction notices in Psychological Science more often
mentioned mistakes in the data-analysis and involved pertinent results, whereas issues regarding
metadata were less prevalent compared with the other two journals. Of course, it is difficult to
attribute this apparent difference (exclusively) to the journals’ policies. Alternatively, the editorial/
copyediting process could be more rigorous at Psychological Science leading to fewer metadata
mistakes, and/or their articles might be more likely to draw attention from other researchers looking
to critically examine the data-analysis, for example.
4.2. Glass half-empty?
The current situation is less than ideal for a number of reasons. First, one might argue that there is a bias
in the type of corrections that get published. Errors that could change the conclusions might end up in the
file drawer, for instance, because journals implicitly discourage the publication of such corrections, or as a
result of the (perceived) stigma surrounding the admission of mistakes. In other cases, seemingly
fundamental alterations (e.g. correlations reversing signs, switching constructs due to errant coding,
and the like) get portrayed as minor changes that do not impact the conclusions. Alternatively, it
might mean that the findings in question are very robust, or that the corresponding theories are
unfalsifiable to begin with.
Second, we happened to notice that some corrections still contained errors or even introduced new
ones. This seems to indicate that there is little reviewing involved, and that they are seen as a
formality or a nuisance, rather than a source of information for readers.
Third, in some cases, authors themselves discover an error in their work, but it is not uncommon for
researchers to stumble upon an error in someone else’s paper. Our results show that very few corrections
actually mention or thank a third party, by name or anonymously, for uncovering the error(s). This might
merely reflect a low prevalence of such instances. However, we know from anecdotes on social media
and personal experience that some corrections in our sample did not acknowledge the researcher(s)
who discovered the error(s). Consequently, the true rate of such instances might be higher. Note
though that in those cases both the authors and the journal do not follow the guidelines regarding
publication credit. For instance, the code of conduct of the APA states: ‘Minor contributions to the
research or to the writing for publications are acknowledged appropriately, such as in footnotes or in
an introductory statement.’ It is unclear why these guidelines would not apply to correction notices,
except perhaps those involving trivial changes (e.g. the spelling of an author’s name). Indeed, one
could even make the case for coauthorship as some instances pertain ‘[s]ubstantial contributions to …
the analysis or interpretation of data for the work’ (International Committee of Medical Journal
Editors, [23]), provided that other criteria such as approval of the final version, and accountability for
the work are also fulfilled.
A last issue, related to the previous point, concerns the procedure of handling mistakes spotted by
other researchers. The obvious first step is to contact the original authors. But what if they do not
respond, or acknowledge the mistake vowing to inform the journal, yet nothing seems to happen? As
far as we know, there are very few recommendations to streamline this process. Frontiers does have a
general complaints policy, which also covers issues about the scientific validity of a paper. More






































the journal if the authors do not respond or take no further action (‘Publishing Model’, n.d. [24]). In
addition, they require a detailed description of any exchanges with the authors as well as ‘an
annotated PDF of the article … that clearly marks the passages concerned and the reasons why they
are of concern.’ Such policies arguably encourage researchers to remain silent about mistakes they
discovered in someone else’s work.
4.3. Or glass half-full?
There is definitely room for improvement in terms of journal policies and researchers’ attitudes regarding
individual self-correction. However, there is also reason for optimism. For instance, Rohrer et al. [19]
initiated the loss-of-confidence project in which they call for researchers to disclose their doubts about
previously published work. Such initiatives can help alleviate the stigma surrounding individual self-
correction, and thus provide the impetus for their (re)appreciation. In this regard, it is noteworthy that
replication studies, another form of scientific self-correction, were very unpopular within psychology
(Makel et al. [25]), but are gradually becoming more mainstream in recent years [13]. Perhaps, we
might see a similar trend for (non-trivial) corrections. After all, they offer an important and efficient
way to progress science as a whole. We hope that by raising awareness regarding their potential and
pointing out some shortcomings, both researchers and journals will aim to optimize the content and
guidelines pertaining correction notices.
4.4. Prevention is better than cure
Rather than having to correct mistakes, we, as a field, should also strive to avoid mistakes. In this final
section, we discuss some concrete approaches researchers and journals could take to achieve that goal.
This is by no means an exhaustive list, and we also do not discuss potential macro-level initiatives
(e.g. changing the publish-or-perish culture might give researchers more breathing room to carry out
and check their work (even) more rigorously).
A substantial portion of errors in our sample involved misreporting statistical output. For instance,
one correction notice stated that inconsistencies arose ‘because of errors copying values from previous
drafts, missed lines in the SPSS output, and reference to outdated datasets and analyses during a
protracted write-up process’ [26, p. 1]. Such mistakes can be averted to a considerable extent by
adopting (a combination of) sound practices like keeping a well-documented data-management plan,
and/or using software to integrate one’s analysis code into their manuscript (e.g. rmarkdown or
jupyter notebooks). In addition, one could work with a ‘co-pilot’; someone, often a co-author, who
independently verifies data-handling, data-analysis, reporting etc. (e.g. [27]). One could also use tools
such as statcheck [4] to ascertain that (certain aspects of) the results are properly reported. In fact,
some journals, including Psychological Science, run all to-be-published articles through statcheck or
require authors to provide a clean statcheck report themselves (‘2020 Submission Guidelines’, n.d.
[20]). However, high-quality journals could (or should) go further in their efforts to properly vet
prospective manuscripts. They could appoint one or more specialists to thoroughly verify the
reproducibility of a study’s outcomes as a (final) part of the review process (see also Sakaluk et al.
[28]). This is for instance the case for articles published in Biometrical Journal, where accepted articles’
data and code get reviewed, either by the so-called Reproducible Research Editor or an external
reviewer. According to a report by Hofner et al. [29], this takes an average of 54 days, often including
one or more rounds of revision, which is somewhat comparable to the proofreading process, except
that permanent reproducibility issues would prompt a reassessment of the work.
Currently, some reviewers take it upon themselves to perform a reproducibility check, which can be
very time-consuming, and arguably goes beyond what one ought to expect from a voluntary service to
the field. This is where journals could play an important role, thereby also addressing questions
regarding their added value, since technological advancement has rendered their dissemination and
type-setting role quasi obsolete. Moreover, as the rate of data sharing will (presumably) increase
(further), for instance, due to journal policies (e.g. [30]), so will the potential to uncover previously
undetectable errors (e.g. Hardwicke et al. [3]). It is therefore in a journal’s best interest to avoid having
to issue correction notices on several of its published articles.
Interestingly, a recent survey among editors of psychology journals indicated that specialized
statistical review, defined as the technical assessment provided by statistical experts regarding the
analysis and presentation of quantitative information, rarely occurs and is often regarded as




































reusability and analytical reproducibility (see above), the editors of Cognition issued a commentary [32]
saying that:oyalsocietypEditors and associate editors check that data are made available and in a readable format, but editors and
reviewers cannot take on the responsibility of checking for analytical reproducibility. Ultimately it is the
authors who are responsible for submitting accurate data to the journal. ublishing.org/journal/rsos
R.Soc.Open
Sci.7:200834In time, journals might change their stance, and follow the example of other fields like biomedicine,
where the (advantage of) in-depth statistical review is more generally recognized [31]. Within
psychology, we only know of one journal, Meta-Psychology, with such a policy. Interestingly, Stephen
Lindsay, former editor-in-chief of Psychological Science, suggested, in his so-called swan song editorial,
that journals and scientific societies should add value to their publications by investing more
resources [33]. Offering independent verification of analytic reproducibility would be an excellent step
in this regard.
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